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Abstract 
We examine the impact of freer trade on equilibrium pollution tax and welfare when markets are imperfectly 
competitive and pollution is transboundary. In the symmetric case, bilateral tariff reduction (i) strengthens 
environmental protection if and only if pollution is sufficiently harmful, and (ii) decreases welfare in the neighbourhood 
of free trade.
 
Citation: Soham Baksi and Amrita Ray chaudhuri, (2009) ''On trade liberalization and transboundary pollution'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 29 
no.4 pp. 2605-2612. 
Submitted: Jun 23 2009.   Published: October 16, 2009. 
 
     1. Introduction
A continuing concern amongst environmentalists is that expanded international trade may
harm the environment. It is feared that competitive pressures generated by freer trade will
force governments to relax their environmental policies in a ￿race to the bottom￿ . The
transboundary nature of many pollutants will make it even less likely that globally e¢ cient
environmental policies are pursued by individual countries acting non-cooperatively. A grow-
ing body of literature has examined these concerns (see, for examples, Krutilla, 1991; Barrett,
1994; Kennedy, 1994; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2003).While identifying
situations where countries may strategically weaken their environmental regulations in order
to capture additional gains from trade, the literature has also pointed out other situations
where trade can improve environmental quality. The latter may occur, for instance, as a
consequence of higher demand for environmental quality that emerges as national income
grows with international trade.
For the case of symmetric countries and transboundary pollution, Kennedy (1994) iden-
ti￿es various strategic considerations that can motivate individual countries to distort their
pollution tax. He concludes that under free trade the non-cooperative equilibrium pollution
tax in each country will be set at a level lower than what is globally e¢ cient.
Burguet and Sempere (2003) examine how bilateral tari⁄ reduction a⁄ects environmental
policy and welfare in symmetric countries when pollution is purely local. On the one hand,
by increasing output, trade liberalization increases marginal social cost of output, which
tends to tighten environmental policy. On the other hand, lower tari⁄s imply lower import
revenue which tends to make environmental policy more lax. The net impact on equilib-
rium environmental policy depends on the relative strength of these counteracting forces.
Furthermore, Burguet and Sempere show that, when the environmental policy instrument is
a pollution tax, marginal social cost is always less than price. Consequently, by increasing
output, a bilateral tari⁄ reduction always increases welfare of each country.1
This note uses a model similar to Burguet and Sempere (2003) and shows that freer
trade can reduce welfare when pollution is transboundary. The extent to which pollution
crosses borders also in￿ uences whether or not trade liberalization will enhance environmental
protection. Much pollution in the world involves two international dimensions ￿international
trade in polluting goods and the cross-boundary nature of the associated pollution (e.g.
greenhouse gases). While there has been a recent move towards incorporating environmental
issues in international trade agreements, the coordination of trade and environmental policies
across countries remains largely absent. In fact the progressive weakening of control over
their tari⁄ policy, following the signing of international trade agreements, has motivated
many countries to use environmental policy instruments in order to achieve trade policy
objectives (Ederington and Minier, 2003).
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the equilibrium. The
e⁄ect of bilateral trade liberalization on equilibrium pollution tax and welfare are analyzed
in sections 3 and 4 respectively. The last section concludes.
1In their Proposition (p. 31), Burguet and Sempere (2003) note, ￿If the environmental instrument is a
tax (either on output, input, or emissions), a bilateral reduction in tari⁄s increases welfare.￿
12. The model
Consider two identical countries, Home and Foreign, with segmented markets. There are n
￿rms in each country (n ￿ 1). All ￿rms produce a homogeneous good and face a constant
marginal cost of production c: Each Home (Foreign) ￿rm sells x (y) units of the good in the
Home market and x￿ (y￿) units in the Foreign market. Foreign variables are denoted by the
superscript ￿￿￿ .
In each market, ￿rms compete in quantities. Demand in each country is identical and
given by
p(q) = p(0) ￿ q
where p(0) ￿ c ￿ a > 0; and q is total quantity sold in the relevant country. Each country
charges a tari⁄ at the same rate of z per unit of import from the other country. The tari⁄
is given exogenously in our model, and trade liberalization takes the form of equal bilateral
reduction in the tari⁄rate. This re￿ ects the situation subsequent to the signing of free trade
agreements between countries.2
A by-product of production in this industry is pollution. It is assumed that, for every unit
of output produced, the ￿rms emit one unit of pollution.3 The pollution is transboundary and
￿ 2 [0;1] fraction of pollution generated in one country a⁄ects the other country. Di⁄erent
values of the ￿transboundary pollution parameter￿ , ￿; allow us to consider a continuum
of cases ranging from strictly local pollution (￿ = 0) to perfectly transboundary pollution
(￿ = 1).
The damage from pollution is monotonically increasing and convex in the level of emis-
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where ￿ ￿ 0 is the pollution damage parameter. In (1) and (2); n(x + x￿) denotes the total
production undertaken in Home and n(y + y￿) the total production undertaken in Foreign.
The environmental policy in each country is a tax imposed per unit of emission by domestic
￿rms.4 The pollution taxes are denoted by t and t￿ for Home and Foreign, respectively.
The sequence of moves is as follows. In the ￿rst stage, (an environmental authority in)
each country chooses its pollution tax to maximize the country￿ s own welfare, taking the
other country￿ s pollution tax as given. In the second stage, each ￿rm takes the policies set
by the countries and the output decisions of the (2n ￿ 1) other ￿rms as given, and maximizes
its pro￿ts. The equilibrium is computed using backward induction.
2For example, NAFTA required member countries to reduce their tari⁄s in equal annual stages over a
speci￿ed number of years.
3Allowing abatement by ￿rms does not change our results qualitatively.
4Given our assumption of constant emission intensity of output, a tax per unit of emission is equivalent
to a tax per unit of the polluting good.
22.1 Second stage: Output decision of ￿rms
Let the total quantity sold in Home be Q = n(x + y) and that in Foreign be Q￿ =
n(x￿ + y￿): Each Home ￿rm chooses x and x￿ to maximize its pro￿t
max
x;x￿ x(a ￿ Q) + x
￿(a ￿ Q
￿) ￿ t(x + x
￿) ￿ zx
￿ (3)
Similarly, each Foreign ￿rm chooses y and y￿ to maximize its pro￿t
max
y;y￿ y(a ￿ Q) + y
￿(a ￿ Q
￿) ￿ t
￿ (y + y
￿) ￿ zy (4)
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities sold in Home and Foreign are computed as
x =
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2n + 1
(8)
We assume that parameter values are such that each of the above quantities is positive.
Home￿ s total production is n(x + x￿), total consumption is n(x + y), and net import is
n(y ￿ x￿) = n(t ￿ t￿). Home￿ s net import thus depends positively on Home￿ s pollution tax
and negatively on Foreign￿ s pollution tax. Similarly, net import of Foreign is n(x￿ ￿ y) =
n(t￿ ￿ t).
2.2 First stage: Equilibrium environmental policy
In the ￿rst stage, each country chooses the pollution tax that maximizes its own welfare, tak-
ing as given the tari⁄level and the other country￿ s pollution tax. In Home, social welfare, W;
is given by
W (t;t
￿) ￿ CS + PS + TR + ER ￿ D (9)
where consumer surplus CS = 1
2 (n(x + y))





revenue TR = zny, pollution tax revenue ER = tn(x + x￿); and pollution damage D is as
given by (1).
The FOC for welfare maximization,
@W(t;t￿)
@t = 0; yields an expression for Home￿ s tax,
t(t￿), which is its best response to Foreign￿ s tax, t￿. The SOC is satis￿ed since
@2W (t;t￿)
@t2 = ￿n
24￿n2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + 4n(2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + 1) + 4￿ + 3
(1 + 2n)
2 < 0
3In a symmetric equilibrium, where both countries are identical, the pollution tax of each
country will be equal. Hence, imposing t = t￿ in the expression for Home￿ s tax, t(t￿); gives
the Nash equilibrium tax in each country as
t(z) =
2n￿ (1 + ￿)(1 + n ￿ n￿)(2a ￿ z) ￿ 2(1 + n)(a ￿ nz) + z
4n((1 + ￿)(1 + n) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ n￿))
(10)
Three sources of distortions that tend to make the equilibrium tax globally ine¢ cient are
as follows.5 First, there is the ￿transboundary externality e⁄ect￿that tends to lower t from
its globally e¢ cient level, as each country ignores the impact of pollution created within its
boundary on welfare in the other country. Second, there is the ￿rent capture e⁄ect￿that
also works to lower the pollution tax. Each government has a strategic incentive to provide
a competitive advantage to its domestic ￿rms so that they are able to capture more foreign
rent. Third, there is a ￿pollution-shifting e⁄ect￿(or NIMBY e⁄ect) that tends to increase
t, as each country tries to drive polluting production from itself to the other country.
The transboundary externality e⁄ect and the pollution-shifting e⁄ect exists only when
pollution crosses jurisdictions. As ￿ increases from 0 to 1, the former e⁄ect becomes stronger
while the latter e⁄ect becomes weaker. Note that when the good is clean (i.e. ￿ = 0), both
these e⁄ects are non-existent. Moreover, the rent capture e⁄ect disappears when the market







As long as there is positive tari⁄, each country enjoys tari⁄ revenue on imports and has to
pay for exports. This gives them an incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic
production, and consequently to tax domestic ￿rms (the ￿tari⁄ e⁄ect￿on the equilibrium
tax). Only when trade is free (i.e. z = 0) as well, will the equilibrium tax rate (11) in each
country become zero.6
The interaction of the above-mentioned e⁄ects determines each country￿ s choice of the
pollution tax. In the symmetric equilibrium, substituting t = t￿ = t(z) in (5)-(8), we have
total output produced equal to total output consumed in each country, so that its net import
is zero.7 The total output, produced or consumed, in each country is
Q = n(x + x
￿) = n(x + y) =
1
2
2(n + 1)(a ￿ z) + z
(1 + ￿)(n + 1) + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿n)
A bilateral reduction in tari⁄ leads to an increase in total output as
@Q
@z < 0 for ￿ 2 [0;1].




6The impact of the rent capture e⁄ect on the equilibrium tax is given by tj￿=z=0 = ￿ a
2n. Similarly, the




7This is similar to reciprocal dumping (Brander and Krugman, 1983).
43. Impact of trade liberalization on pollution tax
The impact of bilateral tari⁄reduction on the previously mentioned e⁄ects, and their trade-
o⁄, determines how equilibrium pollution tax changes. It is observed that
@t(z)
@z ￿ 0 if and
only if
￿ ￿
1 + 2n + 2n2
2n(￿ + 1)(1 + n ￿ n￿)
￿ ￿1
Consequently, we have
Proposition 1: Bilateral trade liberalization increases the equilibrium pollution tax if and
only if pollution is su¢ ciently harmful (i.e. ￿ > ￿1).
Note that the threshold value of the pollution damage parameter ￿1 itself depends on
the extent to which pollution is transboundary. As output increases and price falls with
trade liberalization, it increases the generation of and damage from pollution, and decreases
rents. Consequently, a country￿ s incentive to raise tax to drive out polluting production
increases, and its incentive to lower tax to capture additional rents decreases. These exert
an upward pressure on the equilibrium pollution tax. However, a lower tari⁄ also reduces
tari⁄ revenues from imports. This reduces the country￿ s incentive to substitute foreign
production for domestic production by increasing the tax. As a result, equilibrium pollution
tax tends to decrease. The net impact on the tax depends on the relative strength of the
two counteracting forces.
4. Impact of trade liberalization on welfare
The equilibrium welfare of each country, denoted by W (z), can be derived by substituting
t = t￿ = t(z) into W (t;t￿), where t(z) is the equilibrium pollution tax given by (10) and
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4(￿ (￿ + 1)(n￿ ￿ n ￿ 1) ￿ 1 ￿ n)
2 (12)
From (12), Proposition 2 follows.
Proposition 2: In the presence of transboundary pollution, a marginal bilateral tari⁄ re-
duction leads to an increase in the welfare of each country (i.e. @W
@z ￿ 0) if and only if the
initial tari⁄ rate z is su¢ ciently large (speci￿cally z ￿
2￿￿a(1+￿)
￿(1+￿)2+1 ￿ z1).
By increasing output, tari⁄ reduction increases marginal social cost and reduces price.
Whether this increases welfare of a country or not depends on whether initially price exceeds
marginal social cost of output in that country. When pollution is cross-boundary, Proposition
2 indicates that welfare is non-monotonic and concave in z. It is only when tari⁄is su¢ ciently
high (z > z1), and the associated output su¢ ciently low, that price exceeds marginal social
5cost. An increase in output due to bilateral tari⁄ reduction then increases welfare. The
opposite result holds when z < z1.8 The appendix provides a numerical example in support
of Proposition 2.
Note that the threshold value of tari⁄, z1, is an increasing function of the transboundary
pollution parameter ￿ (i.e.
@z1
@￿ > 0). In fact when pollution is purely local (as in Burguet






This paper examines the impact of trade liberalization on the non-cooperative equilibrium
pollution tax and welfare when pollution is transboundary. The extent to which pollution
crosses borders a⁄ects the magnitude of the pollution shifting e⁄ect and the tradeo⁄ be-
tween this e⁄ect, the rent capture e⁄ect, and the tari⁄ e⁄ect. Liberalizing trade changes
the tradeo⁄, and is shown in the paper to a⁄ect equilibrium pollution tax and welfare in
ways that depend on the transboundary pollution parameter. Speci￿cally, when pollution is
transboundary and the tari⁄ rate is su¢ ciently small, freer trade is likely to reduce welfare.
A further implication is that welfare changes due to marginal bilateral changes in tari⁄ can
be an inaccurate predictor of welfare changes due to discrete jumps in tari⁄ (to free trade,
for example).
While the various e⁄ects described above will exist even in a more general setting, the
simplifying assumptions in our model provide su¢ cient conditions for the results we obtain.￿
Appendix
Here we provide a numerical example in support of Proposition 2. Suppose the previously-
de￿ned parameters in our model take the following values
a = 100; n = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:1
Then the threshold value of the tari⁄, as de￿ned in Proposition 2, is z1 = 9:95.
Suppose the prevailing tari⁄ rate is z = 1. Then the equilibrium pollution tax is t = 38:
37, quantities are x = y￿ = 12:73 and x￿ = y = 11:73, and welfare is W = 2247:5. Moreover,
from (12), we have @W
@z = 3:35 > 0. Thus a marginal bilateral tari⁄reduction causes welfare
of each country to decrease in this case. For instance when tari⁄ falls to z = 0, welfare
decreases to W = 2243:9.
Alternatively, suppose z = 12. Then t = 38:49, x = y￿ = 17:1, x￿ = y = 5:1, and
W = 2261:7. Moreover, from (12), we have @W
@z = ￿0:76 < 0. Thus a marginal bilateral
tari⁄ reduction leads to an increase in welfare in this case. For instance when tari⁄ falls to
z = 11, welfare increases to W = 2262:2.
8Maximizing W with respect to both t and z yields optimal value of the tari⁄ as z1.
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